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In the psycholinguistic literature it has been proposed that readers and listeners often
adopt a “good-enough” processing strategy in which a “shallow” representation of
an utterance driven by (top-down) extra-grammatical processes has a processing
advantage over a “deep” (bottom-up) grammatically-driven representation of that same
utterance. In the current contribution we claim, both on theoretical and experimental
grounds, that this proposal is overly simplistic. Most importantly, in the domain of
anaphora there is now an accumulating body of evidence showing that the anaphoric
dependencies between (reflexive) pronominals and their antecedents are subject to
an economy hierarchy. In this economy hierarchy, deriving anaphoric dependencies
by deep—grammatical—operations requires less processing costs than doing so by
shallow—extra-grammatical—operations. In addition, in case of ambiguity when both
a shallow and a deep derivation are available to the parser, the latter is actually
preferred. This, we argue, contradicts the basic assumptions of the shallow–deep
dichotomy and, hence, a rethinking of the good-enough processing framework is
warranted.
Keywords: anaphoric dependencies, good-enough processing, variable binding, coreference, (reflexive) pronouns,
economy hierarchy
INTRODUCTION
The marriage between linguistic theory and experimental psycholinguistics is a tumultuous one.
On the one hand the one cannot live without the other, on the other hand, their relationship is
characterized by frequent quarrels and misunderstandings. The tension is nicely shown by the
following two quotes on “deep” vs. “shallow” processing. One is from Marantz (class lectures,
2000):
(1) Deep processing (our label, borrowed from the literature)
“The split between linguistics and psycholinguistics in the 1970’s has been interpreted as being a
retreat by linguists from the notion that every operation of the grammar is a mental operation that
a speaker must perform in speaking and understanding language. But, putting history aside for the
moment, we as linguists cannot take the position that there is another way to construct mental
representations of sentences other than the machinery of grammar....There is no retreat from the
strictest possible interpretation of grammatical operations as the only way to construct linguistic
representations.”
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The other position is aptly illustrated by a quote from Ferreira
(2003):
(2) Shallow processing
“The results . . . . suggest that a comprehensive theory of language
comprehensionmust assume that simple processing heuristics are
used during processing in addition to (and perhaps sometimes
instead of) syntactic algorithms. Moreover, the experiments
support the idea that language processing is often based on
shallow processing, yielding a merely “good enough” rather than
a detailed linguistic representation of an utterance’s meaning.”
Over the last decade, Ferreira’s and related positions prompted
a substantial line of research examining the driving forces in
language processing. The broad scope of Ferreira’s claim becomes
particularly clear in a recent elaboration of the shallow, or “good-
enough,” processing position in Karimi and Ferreira (2015). That
is, from their comprehensive overview of the literature and
their implementation of a general “online cognitive equilibrium”
model of language processing, one must conclude that they
intend the good-enough processing position to hold generally
across linguistic domains, arguing that “algorithmic procedures
for sentence processing are not only too costly but sometimes
outright unnecessary.”
Since the shallow processing position has become an
influential one, it deserves careful scrutiny. Yet, if we want to
fully understand it, we are facing the fact that the mechanisms
for shallow processing have not been formulated explicitly:
it remains unclear how, precisely, they do their work. For
instance, in order to fully understand the quote in (2) it is
important to have a clear understanding of what counts as a
heuristic. However, as Karimi and Ferreira state themselves,
“the nature of the simple rules that guide heuristic processing
is unclear.” They do, however, provide the following helpful
characterization: “We believe that this (=heuristic, K&R)
processing relies more heavily on top-down information from
semantic memory, whereas algorithmic processing seems to rely
more heavily on linguistic knowledge to derive meaning in a
bottom-up way, by organizing and combining the unfolding
input using well-defined, successive linguistic rules. “It this
‘top-down’ vs. ‘bottom-up’ characterization of the relevant
contrast, we will rely on in our discussions in the current
contribution.
Furthermore, we would like to submit that if one wants to
argue that in a particular situation people only assign a shallow
interpretation, there is no escape from the requirement to make
precise what this interpretation is, and which processes are
involved in its derivation. Also in this respect the good-enough
approach leaves some fundamental questions open.
The Nature of Good-Enough
Representations in Language Processing
To illustrate the issues raised above further, let’s think more
carefully about the basic question of what counts as a good-
enough representation. Note, that this question relates to rather
fundamental questions about meaning representation. But, for
the purpose of the present contribution we will try to stay as
concrete as possible. Consider, then, the utterance in (3):
(3) The girl pushed the boy.
We would take it that in order to be good enough the utterance
should be interpreted as representing a pushing relation rather
than a kissing relation or an injuring relation. But, suppose
we know that the pushing resulted in an injury, would a
representation as an injuring relation still not be good enough?
Perhaps it is, perhaps it isn’t. In any case, it seems to us that a
representation in which the boy does the pushing and the girl is
pushed would certainly not count as good enough.
Now consider a case with quantifiers as in (4):
(4) Some girl pushed every boy.
Which scopal relation should count as good enough? Suppose
every boy scoping over some girl is intended (with each boy being
pushed by a different girl), is then the alternative with some girl
scoping over every boy (that is, all the boys are being pushed by
the same girl) still good enough? It seems, then, that the notion
“good enough” in isolation is problematic. And in fact this is
already illustrated in Ferreira’s (2003) discussion. As she shows,
in a remarkable number of cases participants assign a wrong
interpretation to sentences. Thus, the question to ask is what
representation, given limitations on attention and processing
resources, will have to make do for a particular hearer in a
particular situation, and how it is derived.
One area that provides a simple illustration of the different
perspectives and the problems associated with the notion good
enough is the interpretation of reversible passives as in (5)
(Grodzinsky, 1995; Ferreira, 2003). As is well-known, children,
agrammatic aphasics, but also certain typical speakers with
no known deficit (Ferreira, 2003), show problems interpreting
reversible passives1. For instance, agrammatic aphasics may show
above chance performance on the active (5a), but only chance
performance on the passive (5b), allowing (5c) as a possible
interpretation.
(5) a. The girl pushes the boy. (Above chance performance).
b. The boy is pushed by the girl. (Chance performance).
c. The boy pushes the girl.
One may then hypothesize (as did Grodzinsky) that agrammatic
aphasics cannot link the surface position of the boy to the
object position in which it is assigned its semantic role. As
such, the boy cannot receive a theme role. Or, in a less explicit
manner, hypothesize, as did Ferreira (2003) in a study of typical
participants, that there is a cost in following the grammatical
algorithms. Consequently, in this view, the participants in these
tests resort to an extra-grammatical interpretation strategy, based
on the idea that there is a hierarchy of semantic roles and that the
agent role is the most prominent role in this hierarchy2.
1See Da˛browska (2012) for the claim that such differences in interpretation reflect
differences in acquisition, but Reuland (2012) for a demonstration that this claim
is unwarranted.
2Or, hearers may adopt a simple Noun-Verb-Noun heuristic based on frequency
patterns (Townsend and Bever, 2001). But this again raises non-trivial questions.
That is, even if one assumes that this heuristic could be obtained on the basis of
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(6) Assign the agent role to the leftmost NP of the clause as a
default role.
This simple rule of agent first is indeed a good example of
a top-down heuristic involving an extra-grammatical principle.
Participants use this strategy to assign a role to the boy and
interpret (5b) as (5c). Thus, crucially, in such a case the meaning
representation arrived at is certainly not good enough. In fact it is
not good at all. But it is the representation the participant arrives
at and for him or her has to make do.
From these and similar results Ferreira (2003; see also e.g.,
Karimi and Ferreira, 2015) concludes that the field of language
comprehension should adopt an approach similar to that taken
in the Fast and Frugal Heuristics models (Gigerenzer et al., 1999;
Gigerenzer, 2000), who take the position that “Models of rational
choice which assume ‘unbounded rationality’ are unrealistic
because the computations that are assumed to take place are often
far too burdensome for real creatures operating in demanding
environments.” In the context of our present discussion, this
would imply that a complete syntactic parse of a sentence—
i.e., demanding the application of a wide range of grammatical
computations—often yields a situation that is too burdensome
for real creatures.
A crucial assumption is, then, that shallow processing—by
avoiding a full syntactic parse and applying extra-grammatical
heuristics instead—is cheaper than deep processing—which is
based on the application of all available syntactic algorithms. This
assumption clearly embodies an empirical claim. Let’s call this
assumption the shallow advantage. A second assumption, crucial
for a fast and frugal heuristic to be viable at all is that using
shallow strategies can in principle yield a similar interpretive
result as grammatical computations—at least roughly so, even if
speakers don’t always do so. That is, even if such representations
may be “incomplete,” “lacking in detail,” “sketchy,” or “imprecise,”
they have to be good enough to be used (cf. Karimi and
Ferreira, 2015). Let’s refer to this as the shallow equivalence
assumption; a strategy that can only lead to representations
that for principled reasons fail to be at least moderately
equivalent to what would have been derived by grammatical
computations in a particular domain (i.e., a representation
that could never be good-enough), may be frugal, but not
very fruitful for the creatures using it. It is the aim of this
contribution to critically assess these assumptions, which so
far received too little attention in the literature from this
perspective.
In the latter sense our goals are on a par with those of Karimi
and Ferreira (2015), who in their recent proposal elaborated on
the core assumptions of the good-enough processing framework
(e.g., Ferreira, 2003; Ferreira and Patson, 2007). They put
forward two fundamental processing principles that, in fact,
closely mirror the two assumptions formulated above. More
specifically, Karimi and Ferreira specified that “the reason why
frequency—i.e., note thatmost canonical sentences onlymatch this pattern if much
material is ignored—it raises fundamental questions like, how is it stored, and how
is it retrieved, and crucially how does it contribute to interpretation? In fact, it can
only do so if the pattern is interpreted as “Subject Verb Object.” But these are not
surface encoded notions, but in fact already presuppose non-trivial analysis.
sometimes only fast and frugal heuristics rather than deep and
time-consuming algorithms are applied during comprehension
could be because heuristics offer a faster route to equilibrium
(Principle 1). Similarly, the reason why the system is sometimes
satisfied with a good-enough representation and does not exert
the extra effort to engage in deeper processing could be because
heuristics often provides enough equilibrium for the system,
causing it to stay in that state for as long as possible. . . (Principle
2)” (pp. 6). Furthermore, following Kuperberg’s (2007) syntactic-
semantic model, Karimi and Ferreira claim that the algorithmic
route of their implementation of the good-enough approach is
syntactic in nature. The alternative route, on the other hand,
relies more heavily on top-down information from semantic
memory, and is capable of generating more global meaning
representations of a sentence (intrasentential) or discourse
(intersentential)3.
Hence, Karimi and Ferreira’s Principle 1 is identical to the
shallow advantage assumption. Moreover, even though their
Principle 2 is perhaps formulated less specifically than the
equivalence assumption we ascribe to the good-enough position,
Principle 2 reflects a similar core idea. That is, during the initial
stages of processing there should be a perceived—or at least
anticipated—equivalence between the output of the heuristics
and algorithmic routes—after all, why should a creature be
bothered with the construction of a mental representation that he
or she knows will not be a reasonable reflection of the associated
linguistic input?
To further substantiate their claims, Karimi and Ferreira
(2015) present a comprehensive overview of studies that,
in their opinion, are best explained by adopting a fast
and frugal approach to language processing. These studies
examined shallow linguistic processing for a wide range
of different phenomena, such as the Moses Illusion, local
syntactic ambiguities in garden-path sentences, quantifier scope
ambiguities, erroneous interpretations of syntactically complex
sentences, and the resolution processes of referring expressions
(for references and more discussion, see Karimi and Ferreira,
2015).
As becomes clear from the discussion of Karimi and Ferreira
(and as pointed out to us by one reviewer), a problem that arises
if we set out to evaluate the shallow processing position is that
the term “shallow processing” (originally due to Carter, 1985) is
being used to refer to two different types of “shallowness” that
must be kept apart—although they are not entirely unrelated.
One involves the top down use of information from semantic
memory, as briefly mentioned above. The other involves what
one may call reduced processing.
That is, in some of the processing literature (for instance
Stewart et al., 2007), and also some of the cases discussed by
Karimi and Ferreira, shallow processing comes down to simply
not fully processing part of the input—or at least delaying its
integration (cf. Von derMalsburg andVasishth, 2013). As Stewart
3Note that this use of the term semantics is different from ours.Whereas semantics
in the model we will present refers to logical form (LF) representations, the label
semantics in Kuperberg (2007) and Karimi and Ferreira (2015) in part reflects
lexical semantics, and in part would be classified as discourse representations in
our model.
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et al. argue, in processing an input like Pauli lent Rickj the CD
before hei/j left for the holidays the processor my simply disregard
the temporal clause initially, and only yield a representation for
Paul lending the CD to Rick. This type of shallow processing
does not involve extra-grammatical heuristics. There is no top-
down use of information coming from semantic memory and,
in fact, it is compatible with deep processing using standard
grammatical algorithms of whatever has been admitted to the
processing buffer. For want of a better term, we will refer to it as
“shallow-by-reduction” or shallow-R, in order to avoid confusion.
Shallow-R processing in the Stewart et al.’s sense (i.e., as
partial non-processing) is not what we primarily address in
this contribution—although it still raises non-trivial questions
about the representations that are being derived. Instead, we
will be focusing on claims about the type of shallow processing
that explicitly involves the use of top-down information—
including the use of extra-grammatical heuristics. We will refer
to this notion of shallowness as “shallow-by-top-down,” briefly
shallow-TD.
This brings us to our main concern with these latter type of
heuristics, which is actually three-fold, and can be summarized
as follows: (1) it is unclear how they actually do the job they are
taken to perform; (2) it is unclear whether they are necessary
at all; (3) it is unclear—if they exist—why/whether they would
be cheaper than the use of syntactic algorithms. We will start
the discussion of these concerns on the basis of the agent first
heuristic in the (shallow) interpretation of passive sentences—i.e.,
before moving on to anaphoric dependencies, which will be the
main test case in the current contribution for the shallow-by-top–
down position.
The Agent First Heuristic in Passive
Sentences
Linguistic theory moves forward at a considerable pace.
Consequently, considerations from the past need no longer apply
to the current state of affairs. For instance, if it is claimed, after
Slobin (1966), that “nonreversible sentences can be understood
by going directly to the semantic roles without an intervening
syntactic structure,” we can easily see this is overly simplistic. As
we now know, thematic role assignment is not just a matter of
an argument “encountering” a predicate—containing an empty
slot—in the mental working buffer and “filling the hole.” Rather,
the process involved minimally depends on verb and role type as
shown for the contrasts between the processing of different types
of intransitive verbs demonstrated in Koring et al. (2012).
Thus, even simple intransitive predicates have more internal
structure than meets the eye, and this carries over to our initial
example of passives. It is important to see that—in order for
there to be a meaning representation at all—the boy in (5b)
must be assigned a position to be formally identified as a subject
(checking agreement, and/or case), that is, to function as an
argument of the verb and its associated functionalmaterial. Given
that under this construal it receives—mistakenly—the agent role,
it must be able to semantically integrate with the verb in this
capacity. Furthermore, the girl must be construed as the object
and interpreted accordingly as bearing the theme role associated
with this position. There is no escape from the assumption that
in assigning this interpretation to the sentence, the processor has
to treat the passive verb form as the active entry to which it is
lexically related (Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart and Siloni, 2005). This
it can only do if it disregards function words, such as by and is,
and morphology like—ed. Thus, when (5b) is in fact interpreted
as (5c), the “active” computation still needs to take place, which
is not necessarily shallow at all. Or to put it bluntly, also deriving
a “wrong” interpretation requires explicit computations unless one
advocates resorting to magic.
But there is a further question. Namely, is an auxiliary,
heuristics-based, interpretation strategy in fact necessary in this
case? Recall that (5b) can only be interpreted as (5c) if the
processor disregards the relevant functional elements. But note,
that if it does so, the active interpretation is the only one that
can be assigned. So in fact, no recourse to auxiliary strategies
is needed. It is enough to assume that under certain conditions
some functional elements—here, those necessary for a passive
construction—will not enter the buffer of the processing system,
and the processor simply works with what is has. From the
perspective of Marantz’s thesis in (1), then, one may assume that
in order to interpret (5b) as (5c) a sufficiently articulate structure
will be projected and interpreted by the rules the grammar
contains. Projecting a structure that ignores the functional
material that is present to license the passive interpretation (e.g.,
since it does not fit in the buffer due to cognitive overload,
time pressure etc.), and subsequently using the active base form
of the verb, will be quite enough to derive the interpretation
observed. Hence, the most parsimonious assumption is that, at
least in this domain, no extra-grammatical heuristics—other than
disregarding functional elements—are involved at all. In short,
here, shallow-TD reduces to shallow-R4.
4Note that even the simplicity of a principle like Agent first is in fact not obvious.
Properly considered it hides a considerable number of hidden assumptions.
Consider, therefore, semantic role assignment in more detail:
Task: Assign a semantic role to DP1
(i) DP1 . . . . [VP V . . . .]
Options:
1. Apply compositional interpretation procedure to V, VP, and DP1
2. Go to extra-grammatical set of heuristics, find Agent first and assign Agent to
DP1
The leading idea in heuristic based approaches is that option 2 is less costly
than option 1. But the simplicity of Agent first is misleading. Consider the fuller
structure in (ii):
(ii) DP1 was [VP V-ed by DP2]
In order to get the relevant (wrong) interpretation the processor has to:
1. Leave grammar
2. Access list of heuristic principles
3. Find Agent first
4. Apply Agent first
5. Disregard functional material (was, -ed, by)
6. Apply the predication rule between DP1 and VP
But this raises issues such as:
• What do these heuristic principles arise from?
• Why does searching the list carry no cost?
• For a proper interpretation a non-trivial amount of syntactic/semantic
computation will still have to be carried out (DP1 will have to be interpreted
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Of course, one may argue that at least in some cases utterances
are interpreted by truly shallow processing. In case of high
running emotions people may focus on one or two words in
an utterance, completely ignoring any nuance and complexity
the utterance may carry. And it is true that so far little is
known about the syntax and semantics of exclamations. On the
other hand, there is a growing literature on headlines and other
similarly reduced linguistic expressions, which shows that these
are far from arbitrary, and reflect an articulate linguistic structure
underneath (De Lange, 2008). Thus, even if emotions highly
limit the amount of items that are admitted into the processing
system’s buffer, this does not imply that whatever is admitted
into the system is not subsequently structured and processed with
grammatical means.
The Current Contribution
The discussion on passives as presented above nicely introduces
the assumptions underlying the fast and frugal heuristics model,
in particular the assumption that a full syntactic parse is complex,
and hence, often more costly than the extra-grammatical
strategies the lazy language user has at his disposition—what
we refer to as the shallow advantage. It also becomes clear that
the interpretation of passives is perhaps not the best domain to
further evaluate the issue of top-down vs. bottom-up strategies—
since shallow-TD can be reduced to shallow-R.
In the present contribution we will focus on the domain
of anaphoric dependencies instead. The underlying reason is
twofold. First, in their recent overview of the literature Karimi
and Ferreira (2015) explicitly state that an important case
of shallow processing in discourse is reference processing,
a topic that in their opinion has not received enough
attention in the good-enough literature. Second, and more
importantly, we will argue that the by now firmly established
linguistic theories on anaphoric dependencies allow us to more
directly compare shallow and deep processing. Or to frame
it more in terms of a good-enough approach (and Karimi
and Ferreira’s remark on the cost of algorithmic procedures
for sentence processing): since grammatical computations
and heuristic top-down principles are taken to compete,
the well-defined grammatical (deep/bottom-up) and extra-
grammatical (shallow/top-down) processing mechanisms of
as a generalized quantifier, VP will have to be interpreted as a property that is
a member of the GQ), and functional material will have to be left out of the
computation).
• Why is there no cost involved in the clash between the result of Agent first and
the functional material that is present?
• How does Agent first apply in the case of subject experiencing verbs (hate,
admire), or unaccusatives, whose subjects are not agents?
It seems then that the purported simplicity of Agent first is not clear from the steps
the processor has to take. Now compare this to the derivation by computation:
1. Retrieve V (θ1, θ2)
2. Disregard –ed and by
3. Assign θ2 to DP2
4. Disregard was
5. Apply the predication rule between DP1 and VP and assign θ1 to DP1
None of the further issues arises and, the procedure applies both to agentive and to
subject experiencer verbs, without unwarranted outcomes for other verb classes.
anaphoric dependencies present the perfect testing ground to
critically assess whether grammatical computations are indeed
“too cumbersome for real creatures”—i.e., as compared to their
extra-grammatical alternatives.
In the following sections, we will argue that they are not.
That is, we will argue—primarily on theoretical grounds—
that the shallow equivalence assumption does not hold, at
least not in this specific domain (Section The equivalence
assumption for shallow and deep anaphoric dependencies).
In addition, the shallow-TD advantage assumption has been
evaluated in several experimental studies and, as we will
demonstrate, shown to be false in the domain of anaphoric
dependencies (Sections The shallow-TD advantage assumption:
Preparing the ground and The shallow-TD advantage assumption:
The issue of economy). To us, it seems that this provides
enough reason to be skeptical about the aforementioned
assumptions and, hence, this particular good-enough
implementation of the heuristic/top-down approach to language
processing.
THE EQUIVALENCE ASSUMPTION FOR
SHALLOW AND DEEP ANAPHORIC
DEPENDENCIES
It is a fundamental property of language in its relation to
the world around us—and its mental representation—that
different nominal expressions may receive the same value.
Although nothing forces it—i.e., putting pragmatics aside for
the moment—also nothing prevents that the old baron and the
driver in the following sentence are used to refer to the same
person.
(7) The old baron was crossing the bridge in a ramshackle
carriage. The driver was visibly tired.
In this process of valuation, a linguistic expression is assigned
a value from an extra-linguistic domain. Or more specifically,
which value it receives is not grammatically determined. This
provides a nice case of a potentially shallow-TD operation:
Take an expression and assign it a value; prima facie no
deep grammatical computations involved, and neither much
searching if the referent is prominent in the context (in any
case not more than general heuristics may be expected to
require). Perhaps Karimi and Ferreira (2015) most clearly
articulated this idea, since they state that “the processing
of unambiguous referring expressions is facilitated because
the comprehension system quickly reaches equilibrium by
establishing the referential link between the referring expression
and the antecedent through a simple, quick, and heuristics-
based coindexation process, leading to little if any processing
difficulty.”
Whereas in sentence (7) we are dealing with two lexical noun
phrases, the same option is available for pronominals, as in (8).
(8) This soldier has a gun. Will he attack?
He in (8) can be interpreted as the same individual as
this soldier. However, this option is not available for
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all nominal expressions. The mini-discourse in (9) is
infelicitous:
(9) No soldier has a gun. ∗Will he attack?
This is due to the fact that he and no soldier cannot be co-valued.
No soldier is quantificational, and does not introduce an entity he
can refer to (an observation leading to the canonical distinction
between binding and coreference in Heim, 1982; Reinhart, 1983,
and subsequent work; see also Partee, 1978; Bosch, 1980, 1983).
This makes anaphoric reference such as in (8) impossible. The
same holds true of expressions like every soldier. Note that these
well-known examples have important implications for how one
should interpret the notion “discourse entity.” That is, possible
discourse antecedents are as diverse as soldiers, water, beauty,
head-aches, dissatisfaction, etc. In addition to these nominal
expressions, also sentences, verb phrases, prepositional phrases,
adjective phrases, and tenses, admit anaphoric relations. Thus,
the notion discourse entity must be broad enough to capture
all these cases of anaphora, yet be restrictive enough to separate
them from quantificational cases such as no soldier, or every
soldier.
Crucially, although he cannot be co-valued with no soldier,
it can depend for its interpretation on the latter. This is shown
in (10):
(10) No soldier who has a gun hopes he will shoot.
That is, in (10) he can be semantically bound by no soldier. The
semantic structure of (10) can be represented as in (11) where he
is translated as a variable—x:
(11) No soldier who has a gun (λx.(x hopes [x will shoot]))
Under this construal the dependency of he on no soldier makes
perfect sense. Here we have the relation of argument binding
(A-binding), defined in terms of “logical binding,” as in (12):
(12) A-binding (Reinhart, 2006)
α is A-bound by β iff α is the sister of λ-predicate whose
operator binds β
A crucial difference between coreference and A-binding is that
the latter, but not the former is subject to a structural condition,
namely c-command. Briefly, as indicated by the definition in (12),
the A-binder must be the sister of a constituent containing the
bindee, as in (13):
(13) A-binder [. . . . bindee. . . ]
The role of c-command is clearly illustrated by the contrasts
in (14):
(14) a. The cop who found the criminal arrested him
b. The criminal found by the cop realized the latter would
arrest him
c. ∗The cop who found every criminal arrested him
d. Every criminal found by the cop realized the latter
would arrest him
e. ∗The cop who found no criminal arrested him
f. No criminal found by the cop realized the latter would
arrest him
In (14a), the criminal does not c-command him, hence doesn’t
bind it, but since the criminal is referential and can have a
discourse individual as its value, it can be co-valued with him,
and there is no difference with (14b) where the criminal c-
commands the pronominal; that is in both cases can him end
up as covalued with the criminal. In (14c) every criminal does
not c-command him, hence cannot bind it, hence the contrast
with (14d). The same contrast is found between (14e) and (14f).
Note, that one might argue that (14d) has a shallow counterpart
that results by replacing every criminal by all criminals, and
him by them, and possibly subjects might accept (14c) under
such a construal (giving up on distributivity effects). But (14e,f)
pose an insurmountable challenge to any such strategy; there
is simply no alternative to a procedure in which him relates
to the expression no soldier, and derives its interpretation
from the instructions for interpretation this expression contains,
since there is no discourse individual it could shallowly access
instead5.
In summary, these contrasts show that two different modes
of interpretation must be distinguished: (1) (shallow), directly
assigning two (or more) expressions the same discourse entity
from the interpretation domain (ID) as a value: co-reference as
in (15a), and (2) (deep), interpreting one of the expressions
first via another expression by grammatical—more specifically,







It should be clear from these considerations that the contrast
between co-reference and binding proves that a certain type
of bottom-up (deep) dependency, namely binding, is plainly
impossible to represent top-down (shallowly), without recourse
to grammatical computation. Thus, the equivalence assumption
underlying the shallow approach does not hold—i.e., in the
domain of anaphora there is for principled reasons no extra-
grammatical alternative to binding. This brings us to the
discussion of the shallow advantage assumption—or more
specifically, the shallow-by-top-down (shallow-TD) advantage—
which cannot be refuted as easily on theoretical grounds alone,
but requires recourse to an accumulating body of experimental
evidence.
5Note, that it is crucial to distinguish between an expression and its value—for
instance between the expression John and the individual John denoted by it. This
distinction is often overlooked in the psycholinguistic literature, although clearly
crucial if one wants to relate processing effects to the working of the memory
system.
6One might think that such a two-route model is “uneconomical.”
However, clearly, each of these routes has its own independent
motivation, and given their nature partial overlap between their effects is
unavoidable.
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THE SHALLOW-TD ADVANTAGE
ASSUMPTION: PREPARING THE GROUND
While binding is subject to grammatical conditions, as we saw
in (14), co-reference, by its very nature is not. Furthermore,
binding is not only subject to the c-command requirement but
elements to be bound can also be subject to a locality condition
as illustrated in (16), with binding represented by co-indexing.
(16) a. Alicei expected [the King to admire heri]
b. ∗Alice expected [the Queeni to admire heri]
The upshot is that—as can be easily observed in the vast majority
of languages—a pronominal may not be too close to its binder.
In (16a) Alice is sufficiently far away from her to serve as its
antecedent, but in (16b) the Queen is too close, matches in
features, but yet is not allowed to bind her. This is one of the
main patterns captured by Condition B of the Canonical Binding
Theory (CBT, Chomsky, 1981, 1986)7:
(17) Condition B
A pronominal must be free (=not bound) in its governing
category (=roughly, the domain of its nearest subject).
Condition B is a grammatical principle. But, one may wonder,
why cannot the prohibition expressed by condition B be bypassed
by using coreference? That is, even if the Queen in (16b)
cannot bind her, why cannot the language system simply resort
to the strategy (or top-down heuristic) in (15a), and assign
the same individual to the Queen and to her? If this would
be possible, we would never see the effects of condition B
with referential antecedents, contrary to fact. This led to the
postulation of what one may call a “traffic rule,” reflecting an
economy principle: If a particular interpretation is ruled out by
the grammar, this prohibition may not be bypassed (see Reinhart,
1983; Grodzinsky and Reinhart, 1993; Reinhart, 2006; Reuland,
2011a, for discussion of this principle in various forms). In
short, there are sentences where a binding and a coreference
construal potentially compete, and when the binding dependency
is rejected by the grammar, the coreference alternative is
not considered. This is indicative of an economy ranking:
grammar < discourse, reflected in Reinhart’s Rule I and its
successors8.
The notion of an economy ranking plays an even more crucial
role in the Primitives of Binding (PoB) model developed in
Reuland (2001, 2011a), where the conditions on binding are
derived from more elementary properties of the grammatical
system. In its simplest form this economy measure is based on
the assumption that the language system as whole is “lazy” and
prefers to minimize the number of cross-modular steps, as in
(15b) with one cross-modular step less than (15a)—i.e., in (15a)
7For expository purposes we will ignore the subsequent modifications and
explanations of Condition B in Reinhart and Reuland (1993); Reuland (2001,
2011a).
8Rule I: Intrasentential Coreference (Grodzinsky and Reinhart, 1993):
NP A cannot corefer with NP B if replacing A with C, C a variable
A-bound by B, yields an indistinguishable interpretation.
more information needs to be transferred from the grammar
system to the interpretational system than in (15b).
The dependencies discussed so far were established in the
“translation procedure” from syntactic representations to the
interpretation system. But dependencies can also be pre-encoded
by morpho-syntactic means. Quite characteristically, morpho-
syntactic dependencies are obligatory. Whereas him in (14c)
cannot depend for its interpretation on every criminal, nothing
prevents it from being interpreted as some individual in
the associated discourse. This is different from what we see
with anaphors, like English himself, Dutch zich(zelf), etc. Such
expressionsmust be bound (at least in the core cases, see Reinhart
and Reuland, 1993). Moreover, theymust be bound in a very local
domain, as illustrated for English by the contrast in (18), here
again represented with the index notation:
(18) a. ∗Alicei expected [the King to admire herselfi]
b. Alice expected [the Queeni to admire herselfi]
In (18a) Alice is too far away from herself to serve as its
antecedent, whereas the King is not a suitable antecedent due to
a gender mismatch. As a result the sentence is ungrammatical.
In (18b) the Queen is near enough, matches in features, and
hence, binds herself. This is one of the main patterns captured by
Condition A of the Canonical Binding Theory (CBT, Chomsky,
1981, 1986):
(19) An anaphor is bound in its governing category (=roughly,
the domain of its nearest subject).
A characteristic property of the CBT is that it was based on a mix
of syntactic and semantic properties. The notion of governing
category is syntactic, the notion of binding itself is semantic,
and the notion of an index—one of its key ingredients—was
of a hybrid syntactic-semantic nature. This made it highly
problematic as an ingredient of an explanatory theory (see
Reinhart, 1983, for an initial discussion, and Reuland, 2011b, for
a systematic overview of the problems with indices).
Minimalist approaches to grammatical structure (Chomsky,
1995, and subsequent work) introduced a strict separation
between morpho-syntax and the interpretive system. Indices are
not morpho-syntactic objects, hence, it was concluded, they have
no place in syntax. Consequently, whatever there is syntactic
in the binding conditions—such as locality—has to be derived
with purely syntactic means. The means to do so in syntax
are limited, just Movement and Agree (feature checking and
valuation). This necessitated a thorough rethinking of binding
and the binding conditions. A specific proposal to implement
this was developed in Reuland (2001), and elaborated in Reuland
(2011a). For reasons of space we will limit the discussion here to
a few key issues, starting with condition A of the CBT.
In short, in Reuland (2011a) the locality property of himself is
shown to follow from the semantic fact that self is an inherently
reflexive relational noun. Given this property, self reflexivizes
the predicate of which himself is an argument by—covert—head
movement onto the verb (that is, it is interpreted as a reflexivizing
operator). As we independently know, head-movement is strictly
local (Travis, 1984). Hence, the locality of himself follows from
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the locality of head-movement. Thus, the relevant aspect of the
representation of (18b) is as in (20):
(20) Alice expected [the Queen to SELF-admire her(self)]9
. . . .. the Queen (λx. (x admires SELF (x))
The upshot is, then, twofold. First, the interpretation of
himself /herself involves a purely syntactic movement operation.
Second, it is not just a matter of himself /herself ’looking for
an antecedent’ and being valued by the latter, but the process
crucially involves the reflexivization of the predicate.
Indeed, there is independent experimental evidence that the
processing of SELF-anaphors involves the verb in addition to
whatever properties the antecedent may contribute. For example,
Manika (2014), and Manika et al. (2014) using an information-
theoretic approach (see Kostic´, 1991, 1995 and subsequent
work) show that the interpretation of a referentially dependent
lexical item like Dutch zichzelf is modulated by the complexity
of the verb—as quantified by the inflectional entropy of its
paradigm—indicating that the interpretation of zichzelf involves
an operation on the verb itself10.
Also the binding of simplex anaphors like Dutch zich in (21)
is encoded in the syntax (where SE stands for simplex element
anaphor):
(21) De klimmer voelde [zich wegglijden]
The climber felt [SE slip away]
Here the encoding is brought about by the operation Agree:
zich is deficient for gender and number, and is valued by
Agree copying these features from the antecedent onto zich. The
fact that (22) is ill-formed, again follows from economy (this
contributes to deriving the canonical Condition B).
(22) ∗De klimmer voelde [hem wegglijden]
The climber felt [him slip away]
To account for the fact that (22) is ruled out we apply the same
logic as in the case of Rule I. The anaphoric dependency between
de klimmer and zich in (21) can be encoded in syntax by Agree,
but now consider the case where hem is selected, as in (22). Since
hem is fully specified, it has no empty cells. Consequently, valuing
it in the syntax by Agree is not an option. Hence, zich wins.
But, crucially, this can only work if syntax cannot be bypassed
by a derivation in which hem is directly interpreted as a bound
variable by applying (12). So, syntax has to be considered before
semantic binding can apply, and if syntax rejects the derivation,
this is final. Since a syntactic operation such as Agree operates
locally, we see this competition only when the dependent element
is within the Agree domain of the element it is to depend on
9This analysis entails that locality is not an intrinsic property of himself qua being
an anaphor. In fact, in positions from which self cannot move, there is no locality
effect. This is what explains the fact that in (i), where herself is contained in a
coordinate structure from which movement is prohibited there is no locality effect
and herself can be bound by Alice (Reinhart and Reuland, 1991; Reuland, 2011a)
despite the latter’s distance:
(i) Alice was happy that the King invited the Rabbit and herself for tea
10This necessitates a rethinking of the conception of binding in the experimental
literature, where it is mostly assumed that binding is just a matter of the anaphor
looking for an antecedent.
and not when it is further away11. Consequently, we arrive at the
economy ranking in (23).
(23) syntax< semantics< discourse
We have by now prepared the ground for a discussion of the
second assumption of good-enough interpretations: Are, deep—
grammatical—operations indeed more costly for the processor
than shallow-TD operations (i.e., in contrast to the economy
ranking as depicted above)?
THE SHALLOW-TD ADVANTAGE
ASSUMPTION: THE ISSUE OF ECONOMY
Interestingly, the issue of economy has received quite a bit of
attention in the experimental literature, though not from the
perspective sketched in the current contribution.
The Economy of Syntax
As is well-known, research on language acquisition shows
an asymmetry between the performance of young children
on condition A as compared to condition B. For instance,
Chien and Wexler (1991) explored the question of whether
children know Principles A and B from the outset or not.
Their experiments show that children correctly require local
antecedents for reflexives (Principle A) early on, whereas they
are significantly delayed in disallowing local antecedents for
pronouns (Principle B). As argued in Grodzinsky and Reinhart
(1993) the computations involving the correct application of
condition B are more costly than those involved in condition
A. From the present perspective this indicates that the syntactic
mode of encoding is indeed the least costly12.
Although it is generally assumed in the psycholinguistic
literature that condition A is a syntactic condition, it may be
good to point out that in the PoB system condition A, as it is
11A simple illustration is provided by 1st person plural pronouns in Brazilian
Portuguese. It has two forms: nós, which is both formally and semantically 1st
person plural, and a gente, which is formally 3rd person singular, but semantically
1st person plural. Nós is free to semantically bind a gente and vice versa, but not
when they are too close. In that case Agree causes a syntactic feature clash. But
crucially, this clash cannot be bypassed by immediately going to the semantics.
Note that this exposition is highly simplified. See Reuland (2011a) for the details.
12As brought up by one of the reviewers, since Chien and Wexler (1991) and
Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993) there has been considerable discussion about the
status of the Delay of Principle B effect. For this discussion two issues must be
distinguished. First, there is the question of whether there is a delay in the proper
interpretations of pronominals at all. Second, as argued by both Chien andWexler,
and Grodzinsky and Reinhart, the delay shows up primarily with referential
antecedents and not with quantificational antecedents. Elbourne (2005) expresses
concerns about the adequacy of the experimental designs in these and subsequent
studies that argue for such a difference between referential and quantificational
antecedents. Conroy et al. (2009) present a number of new experiments that also
call this contrast into question, coupled with an extensive overview of experiments
discussed in the literature. Summarizing these contributions, it is clear that more
factors have to be controlled for than previously assumed, not only involving the
design but also the morpho-syntactic composition of the pronominal elements
being studied (e.g., Baauw, 2002; Hartman et al., unpublished manuscript).
However, even so, one can still maintain that children are more susceptible to
Principle B violations than adults. Moreover, none of the literature cited calls
into question that children behave quite adult-like with respect to condition A.
Consequently, the general claim in the main text is not at issue.
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reinterpreted, is indeed a purely syntactic operation (of course
with semantic consequences). Hence, it is an ideal testing ground
for the shallow vs. deep processing issue.
There are a number of experiments reported in the literature
that test the status of condition A. Crucial for the present
discussion, their results indicate that condition A applies early
in the time course of processing and is, in addition, very robust.
To illustrate this, in a well-known study Sturt (2003) carried out
two eye-tracking experiments measuring (mis)match effects in
sentences such as (24):
(24) Jonathan/Jennifer was pretty worried at the City Hospital.
He/She remembered that the surgeon had pricked
himself/∗herself with a used syringe needle. There
should be an investigation soon.
In all the conditions only one character was structurally available
(i.e., the surgeon, a profession with a stereotypically male gender).
The distracting character (i.e., Jonathan or Jennifer) was highly
prominent in the preceding discourse, yet not accessible as
an antecedent for the reflexive. The results showed that if the
reflexive and structurally available antecedent differed in gender,
this immediately slowed down the reading process. Moreover,
at this point during processing the distracting character (i.e.,
Jonathan/Jennifer) did not influence the resolution process. This
suggests that the language system first attempts to link the
reflexive to an antecedent that is structurally available—which
will immediately fail when there is a gender-mismatch. In a
follow-up experiment Sturt modulated the relative position of
the distractor in the sentence, but the same conclusion was
supported.
These finding are on a par with several other studies
adopting a wide range of methodologies. For example, in an
ERP experiment where the participants processed sentences
such as (25), Xiang et al. (2009) investigate “intrusion effects”
of potential, but non-commanding antecedents that appear—
intrude—on the path between the SELF-anaphor and its
antecedent.
(25) a. Congruent
The tough soldier that Fred treated in the military hospital
introduced himself to all the nurses.
b. Intrusive
The tough soldier that Katie treated in the military hospital
introduced herself to all the nurses.
c. Incongruent
The tough soldier that Fred treated in the military hospital
introduced herself to all the nurses.
Furthermore, they compared these conditions to paired
conditions in a second ERP-experiment in which intruders were
present on the path between Negative Polarity Items and their
licensers. Although they did find intrusion effects in the latter
case, no significant intrusion effects were obtained in the case
of the SELF-anaphor conditions as presented above (i.e., the
ERP-waveforms revealed no difference between condition b
and c). They concluded that during reflexive binding, syntactic
constraints appeared to prevent intrusive antecedents from
influencing the initial stages of anaphor resolution. In our view
this points toward an early and robust application of the syntactic
process establishing the dependency.
As a final example, Cunnings and Felser (2013) investigated
the processing of SELF-anaphors in English, using the eye-
tracking methodology. In their experiments they compared the
performance of low working memory span with high working
memory span readers. Here we will focus on one experiment—
their Experiment 2—in which they measured the effect of a
linearly intervening—but inaccessible antecedent (due to lack of
c-command) using sentences as in (26):
(26) James/Helen has worked at the army hospital for years.
The soldier that he/she treated on the ward wounded
himself/∗herself while on duty in the Far East. Life must be
difficult when you are in the army.
If Principle A would reflect a processing-based constraint this
would lead to a different prediction than if it were a purely
syntactic constraint. In the former case, particularly lower span
readers may initially attempt to keep referential dependencies as
short as possible. If so, main effects of the inaccessible antecedent
should initially be observed. Higher span readers, on the other
hand, would be less likely to find the creation of longer anaphoric
dependencies difficult. It was found that for both lower and
higher span readers the online application of Principle A could
not be reduced to a (shallow-TD) memory-friendly “least effort”
strategy of keeping anaphoric dependencies as short as possible13.
All in all, the joint results of the two experiments they reported
support, as they put it, a growing body of evidence showing that
binding Principle A applies early during sentence processing to
help guide reflexive anaphor resolution (e.g., Nicol and Swinney,
1989; Felser et al., 2009; Felser and Cunnings, 2012; Xiang et al.,
2009; but see Badecker and Straub, 2002, for some conflicting
evidence; see Dillon, 2014, for an excellent overview of all the
relevant results).
Hence, a preferential position of syntactic encoding with
respect to other strategies of anaphora resolution is warranted,
which is in line with the PoB model (but not predicted by
other approaches to binding). Or to put it slightly differently, a
deep syntactic operation like binding of a SELF-anaphor is less
costly for the processor than shallower operations, in contrast to
what the “shallowness” approach predicts. In fact, this already is
sufficient to establish our main point. There is no clear support for
a shallowness advantage. Rather the opposite is the case: for the
human processor deep syntactic computations are preferred over
shallow-TD interpretation processes.
However, it will nevertheless be important to also assess the
other members of the economy hierarchy as formulated in the
PoBmodel: binding and coreference. This is what we will do next.
The Economy of Binding and Coreference
A well-known instantiation of the (economy) contrast between
binding and coreference, introduced in (23) above, shows up in
the interpretation of sentences with VP ellipsis, as in (27):
13Note that such a general least effort principle is highly implausible on other
grounds, given the existence of long-distance anaphors in many languages, for
instance, in Scandinavian.
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(27) John fed his cat and Peter did too
Before we elaborate on this contrast in terms of economy,
however, some facts and assumptions on VP-ellipsis should be
discussed. First of all, it is clear that the second conjunct is about
Peter feeding a cat, rather than about him combing a dog. This,
uncontroversially, is a fact any theory of language will have to
capture. A common idea is that for interpretation to obtain,
the content of the VP in the second conjunct must somehow
be recovered from the preceding context. As a first go one may
assume a copying operation, as in (28).
(28) John fed his cat and Peter did<feed his cat> too.
As one can see, this gives rise to a puzzle, since the elided (i.e.,
covert) pronominal his in the second conjunct is ambiguous.
More specifically, the interpretation of the full sentence can be
either that John fed John’s cat and Peter fed Peter’s cat, as in (29a),
or that John fed John’s cat and that Peter also fed John’s cat, as in
(29b):
(29) a. John (λx. (x fed x’s cat)) & Peter (λx. (x fed x’s cat))
b. John (λx. (x fed a’s cat) & a=J) & Peter (λx. (x fed a’s cat)
& a=J)
In (29a) his is interpreted as a variable, x, A-bound by Peter. This
is what is generally referred to as the bound variable (BV), or
“sloppy”14 interpretation. In (29b), however, his is interpreted as
a constant, here represented as a, which can receive the value
of any individual in the discourse including John. That is, the
occurrences of his in both conjuncts are coreferential (COR),
yielding a “strict” interpretation.
Interestingly, the human processor is sensitive to this
difference, and more importantly, it is a consistent finding
in oﬄine studies that in the interpretation of ambiguous
VP-ellipses, BV-based interpretations are preferred over COR
interpretations (see Frazier and Clifton, 2000, for an overview).
This “preference” is reflected in the fact that typical subjects show
longer reading times on COR in self-paced reading experiments
(reported in Frazier and Clifton). In another experiment on
the interpretation of VP ellipses that involved subjects with
agrammatism, these subjects performed 80% correct on BV
interpretations, but at chance on COR interpretations (Vasic
et al., 2006). Curiously, then, what might seem to be the less
sophisticated—more shallow—procedure, is the one that comes
out as more costly in this case as well.
On the basis of such findings Frazier and Clifton (elaborating
Reinhart, 1983; Avrutin, 1994, 1999) propose the following thesis
as a hypothesis worth exploring:
(30) LF only/first hypothesis:
Bound-variable interpretations are preferred because the
perceiver need only consult the LF representation (not the
discourse representation) in order to identify the bound-
variable analysis of the sentence.
14We use this term since it is so entrenched in the literature. But note that the
“sloppy interpretation” is the one that does require grammatical operations. So,
this is the one that is not shallow.
In order to do so they carry out a number of exploratory
experiments and conclude that the hypothesis, though
compatible with some of their results, is too problematic to
be maintained.
However, as discussed by Frazier and Clifton (see also
Koornneef, 2008; Koornneef et al., 2011) their results should
be interpreted with some care, due to limitations of the
experimental design and the statistical evaluation. In order to
obtain more dependable results, subsequently, a number of
full-size experiments using a more sensitive methodology were
carried out, reported in Koornneef (2008, 2010), and Koornneef
et al. (2006, 2011). Since the case is illustrative of the need to take
theoretical advances into account we will briefly discuss Frazier
and Clifton’s interpretation of their findings before turning to the
experiments of Koornneef and his colleagues.
One of the problems Frazier and Clifton note is of a theoretical
nature. As they observed, a BV-preference also obtains across
sentence boundaries, as in (31) (Experiment 1b). According to
Frazier and Clifton this is incompatible with the nature of LF
operations. That is, one would expect a grammatical operation
like VP-copying to be limited to the domain of a sentence.
(31) Sarah left her boyfriend in May. Tina did [leave her
boyfriend] too.
The other problem is empirical in nature. The choice between
variable binding and coreference also shows up in the
interpretation of only-sentences, illustrated in (32). Here it
concerns the interpretation of the pronominal he in the
complement clause of think. And again the pronoun shows an
ambiguity. However, contrary to VP-ellipsis, Frazier and Clifton
find a preference for a COR interpretation instead of the BV
interpretation.
(32) Only Alfred thinks (that) he is a good cook.
a. Only Alfred thinks that Alfred is a good cook. (COR)
b. The only person who thinks of himself as a good cook
is Alfred.
(BV).
On the basis of these findings, Frazier and Clifton conclude that
the LF-only hypothesis (and equivalents) cannot be maintained.
This, however, leaves a puzzle. Why would the case of VP-ellipsis
be different from the only-case and what conclusions should we
draw about the language processing system? Let’s first address the
theoretical issue Frazier and Clifton raise.
Theoretical Issue: What Mechanism Underlies
Ellipsis?
The mechanism originally assumed in the literature on VP-
ellipsis since Hankamer and Sag (1976) involved a copying
operation (see Elbourne, 2008, for an overview and references).
If so we would have to assume that the empty VP in the second
sentence in (33a)—indicated by1—would be filled by a syntactic
operation applying across sentences.
(33) a. Sarah left her boyfriend in May. Tina did1 too.
b. Sarah (λx. (x left x’s boyfriend)). Tina (λx. (x left x’s
boyfriend)) too.
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This, Frazier and Clifton feel, violates the generally accepted idea
that grammatical operations are limited to the sentential domain.
Therefore, 1 cannot be interpreted by a grammatical copying
operation. The question is, then, what kind of mechanism, is
involved.
In recent years, however, independent evidence has been
found that the theory of ellipsis should allow for greater flexibility
(Merchant, 2001, 2008; Elbourne, 2008). This is illustrated by
cases like (34) (Elbourne, 2008):
(34) Saskia, being a competitive type, has managed to acquire all
the skills that Maaike and Brigitte possess. Maaike dances.
Brigitte sings. Saskia does1 too.
Here, 1 can be interpreted as the combined property of singing
and dancing. In order to account for these and a variety of
other cases, Elbourne proposes that ellipsis sites have internal—
unpronounced—syntactic structure and are to be analyzed as
silent “definite descriptions.” In line with this, (33a) would be
represented as (35), where the label TheP indicates that the
complement of did is such a silent definite description (perhaps
superfluously, we also indicate the silence by strike-through).
(35) Sarah left her boyfriend in May. Tina did [TheP leave her
boyfriend] too.
Then, to interpret the VP-ellipsis, the parser must somehow
access the context (in this case “Sarah left her boyfriend
in May”) to retrieve the values for the constituent parts
of TheP. Elbourne provides an elegant, yet fairly extensive
and technical implementation whose details are beyond the
scope of our present contribution. Relevant here is that, as
he shows, the interpretation of the ellipsis site does not
depend on a sentence-grammar “copy-and-paste operation,”
but rather reflects how a pronominal picks up its reference.
That is, the elided VPs are treated as null pronouns, and
under anybody’s account, pronouns are able to pick up values
from the preceding context. Hence, the relevant difference with
the LF copying account is that under Elbourne’s approach
there is no theoretical reason to expect the context for
the interpretation of VP-ellipsis to be limited to the same
sentence.
What does the above mean for the explanation of a BV
preference in VP-ellipsis like (34) in which the interpretation
of the section “Tina did too” depends on retrieving information
from a previous sentence? In fact, given that Elbourne’s account
obviates the same-sentence constraint, the same mechanisms
are at work as in (28) where the elided site and the context
clause are part of the same sentence. To illustrate this, in (35)
the parser retrieves either “leave x’s boyfriend” as value for the
TheP (i.e., the preferred BV interpretation), or alternatively, it
picks up “leave Sarah’s boyfriend” as a COR alternative. More
specifically, just like in the classic examples of VP-ellipsis—
in which the ellipsis and context clause are part of the same
sentence—any preference for a dependency type in the first
sentence will be inherited by the second sentence in (35). No
additional stipulations are necessary and in fact the theoretical
problem as described by Frazier and Clifton does not arise—
which illustrates yet again the fact that it is important to keep
reassessing the interpretation of experimental results in view of
theoretical advances15.
Empirical Issue: Interpretational Preferences in
Only-sentences17
In addition to a theoretical problem for the BV-preference in VP-
ellipsis, Frazier and Clifton also report an empirical problem for
so-called only-sentences. In order to understand what is at stake
in only-sentences, consider again the pattern in (32), repeated
here with additional material:
(36) Only Alfred thinks (that) he is a good cook.
a. Only Alfred thinks that Alfred is a good cook (COR)
Only Alfred (x thinks Alfred is a good cook)
b. The only person who thinks of himself as a good cook
is Alfred. (BV)
Only Alfred (x thinks that x is a good cook)
Frazier and Clifton conducted a questionnaire study, which
shows a strong preference for the (36a) interpretation among
the respondents. However, there is a caveat about such off-line
studies. They reflect an end-result, but don’t give insight in the
process itself. As it is, if we wish to interpret their results two
questions come up. First, is it just a matter of BV vs. COR, or do
other factors play a role? Second, what kind of information does
15One might wonder if perhaps even a simpler mechanism might work, namely a
preference for an antecedent that is as local as possible. This, however, would not
derive the parallelism the construction shows. One of the available options is a “3rd
party” reading, as for instance in John loves his1 cat and Peter does love his2 cat too,
where his1 could be Charles given a suitable context. If his1 is Charles, his2 has to
be as well. This shows that there is a dependency between the two occurrences of
his that has to be represented in the licensing mechanism.
17Frazier and Clifton also discuss another empirical puzzle, based on their
experiment 1a, a self-paced reading experiment. In this experiment they compare
VP ellipsis internal to a sentence with VP ellipsis across sentences. Sentences (a)
and (b) are neutral in the sense that they are easily compatible both with a BV
and a COR interpretation, whereas (c) and (d) are biased in favor of a COR
interpretation.
a. John thinks it’s a good idea to shave himself before he goes to sleep and Andy
does too. (Bound/Neutral, one sentence)
b. John thinks it’s a good idea to shave himself before he goes to sleep. Andy does
too. (Bound/Neutral, two sentences)
c. John thinks it’s a good idea to shave himself before he goes to sleep and Anne
does too. (Coreferential, one sentence)
d. John thinks it’s a good idea to shave himself before he goes to sleep. Anne does
too. (Coreferential, two sentences)
The puzzle this experiment raises is that the BV advantage seems to disappear
across a sentence boundary as in the (b) and (d) cases. If so, this would suggest
that whatever one sees in VP ellipsis is not the manifestation of a unified
phenomenon. As already noted, the interpretation of their results is not entirely
clear-cut due to the limitations of their design. In this case another complication
arises.
In the contrast between these sentence types three factors are involved: i.
Reflexivization of shave by himself; ii. Control: assigning a value to PRO in PRO
to shave himself; iii. The interpretation of the implicit argument of good idea for
x (PRO to shave himself) as either Andy, or John (assuming Anne to be ruled
out due to the feature mismatch with himself). The latter constitutes a crucial
independent factor, which should have been controlled for, in order for a proper
interpretation of this result to be possible. The experiment, then, appears to bear on
the interpretation of implicit arguments, rather than on VP ellipsis and the LF-first
hypothesis directly.
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the language processor have to draw together, to obtain either a
BV or a COR interpretation in sentences with only?
For a proper understanding of these issues at least the
following crucial fact should be taken into account: Across both
interpretations the fact that Alfred is happy about his own
cooking remains constant. Yet, a full interpretation requires the
representation of some sort of “hidden” reference set consisting
of everybody but Alfred, or in other words the contrast set (e.g.,
Rooth, 1985). The contrast set, implicitly introduced through the
use of the term only, behaves differently in a BV reading than in a
COR reading: whereas in the BV reading each individual member
of the set is not that happy about his own cooking, the contrast set
in the COR reading consists of members who think that Alfred’s
cooking is not very good. Given this, a possible additional factor
in a BV or COR preference is how well the hidden contrast set fits
the context overall.
Thus, a factor to take into account is that, possibly, the hidden
set of the COR reading in the sentences tested by Frazier and
Clifton just fits the context better. In fact, Frazier and Clifton
presented their sentences without an explicit context. But, in
order to interpret only-sentences, participants will have to set up
a context. Thus, the question is what context they construe.
Crain and Steedman (1985) propose a Principle of Referential
Success, reflecting that people choose the reading with the fewest
“open ends.” In view of this, it may well be the case that a strict
interpretation is chosen more often in “only Alfred thinks he is a
good cook” because it is more likely that the sentence is talking
about Alfred’s cooking, which is explicitly mentioned, than about
the cooking of the “entire world.” Hence, the lack of context could
very well bias participants to a COR interpretation regardless
of whether the language processor initially prefers a BV reading
or not. It is therefore crucial to properly investigate the role of
context, and, where necessary, control for its effects.
In summary, Frazier and Clifton (2000) reported both a
theoretical problem and an empirical problem for the LF-only
hypothesis—which incorporates the BV preference. We have
shown that the theoretical problem with VP-ellipsis is in fact not
problematic according to the most recent insights of linguistic
theories. The second problem (a COR preference in only-
sentences), we argued, required further testing. More specifically,
as we will discuss in the next section, it generated the following
hypotheses in (37) and a series of experiments testing them ( e.g.,
Koornneef et al., 2006, 2011; Koornneef, 2008, 2010; Cunnings
et al., 2014).
(37) Hypotheses
- The language processor initially prefers a BV
interpretation.
- Context may then lead to a COR interpretation.
- This (mental) backtracking should be visible in the time
course of the process.
Tracking the Time Course of Anaphora Resolution
The hypotheses presented in (37), and the issues raised by Frazier
and Clifton regarding sentences containing the only-operator,
were addressed by Koornneef et al. (2011) in a questionnaire
(to assess the final interpretation of the participants) and an
eye-tracking experiment (to track the mental processes preceding
this final interpretation). In their study Dutch university students
read a series of short texts in 4 versions about 2 story characters
of the same gender (e.g., Lisa and Anouk, see ex. 38).
(38) Example of BV-biased/only-sentence condition
(S1)Lisa en Anouk zijn dol op de muziekzender MTV. (S2)
Zij konden hun geluk niet op toen zij mee mochten doen
aan het programma “Pimp My Room,” waarin hun kamers
werden opgeknapt. (S3) Alleen Lisa vindt dat haar gepimpte
kamer klasse heeft. (S4) Smaken verschillen nu eenmaal.
“(S1). Lisa and Anouk love the music channel MTV. (S2)
They were very happy when they were selected for the show
‘Pimp My Room,’ in which their rooms were redecorated.
(S3) Only Lisa thinks that her pimped room has a touch of
class. (S4) Oh well, each to his own taste.”
Each story contained a critical third sentence (S3) that
was ambiguous between a sloppy (BV) and strict (COR)
interpretation. Moreover, two factors were manipulated in the
stimuli. First, the critical sentence was an ambiguous only-
sentence (e.g., “Only Lisa thinks that her pimped room has
a touch of class.”) or, alternatively, an ambiguous VP-ellipsis
sentence (e.g., “Lisa thinks that her pimped room has a touch of
class, but Anouk does not”). Second, by providing background
information in the second sentence about both story characters
(“Lisa and Anouk were very happy. . . ”) or, alternatively, about
only one story character (“Lisa was very happy. . . ”), the context
either favored a BV interpretation or a COR interpretation of the
ambiguous critical sentence, respectively.
The results of the questionnaire experiment, in which the
participants presented their final interpretation of the ambiguous
sentence (in addition to providing ratings of story-plausibility
and -difficulty) showed that, while using a relatively, simple
manipulation and exactly the same critical sentence, readers were
more easily biased toward a BV interpretation than toward a COR
interpretation. Moreover, contrary to the findings of Frazier and
Clifton the context manipulation in the second sentence affected
the interpretation of the only-sentences and ellipsis-sentences in
the exact same way. Hence, these finding are consistent with
the idea that the interpretation of the referential ambiguity in
only-sentences and VP-ellipses is driven by the same constraints,
which preferable single out a BV interpretation.
The eye-tracking data of the reading experiment of Koornneef
et al. (2011) confirmed and extended these results. First of
all, the stories in which the interpretation of the ambiguous
sentence was biased toward a BV interpretation elicited shorter
first pass reading times in the critical VP-ellipsis sections than
the stories biased toward a COR interpretation18. Furthermore,
the reading times for the second sentence (i.e., the sentence
that contained the biasing information) also revealed a clear
contrast between the COR- and BV-biased stories. In this case
the second-pass durations—indicative of re-analysis and repair—
were much longer for the COR-biased stories. Interestingly,
18Note that these results confirmed the findings of the self-paced reading
experiments reported by Frazier and Clifton (2000). Hence, across methodologies
and languages there is evidence that readers prefer to assign a sloppy identity to
ambiguous elliptic structures.
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this was observed for ellipsis- and only-sentences alike, which
again suggests that the preference for BV interpretations is not
restricted to ellipses, but a general property of the parser.
In all, the results of the oﬄine questionnaire and in particular
the online eye-tracking experiment were consistent with the
hypotheses as formulated in (37). That is, the readers initially
preferred a BV reading, since BV reflected the cheaper option
in the processing hierarchy. However, when the larger context
forced a COR reading instead, readers reanalyzed the story to
change their initial BV reading into the more suitable COR
reading. This (mental) backtracking surfaced in the eye-tracking
data as longer first-pass reading times near the elided section of
the ellipsis sentences and longer second-pass reading times at the
biasing second sentence.
In a similar eye-tracking study examining the interplay
between BV and COR, Koornneef et al. (2006) showed that the
preference of the parser for BV dependencies generalizes beyond
ambiguous ellipsis- and only-sentences. They observed that in
sentences like (39) containing a quantified antecedent “iedere
arbeider” (every worker) in a c-commanding position and a
proper name “Paul”in a non-commanding position, readersmore
easily connected the ambiguous pronoun to the former than to
the latter—even when the context preceding the critical sentence
clearly mandated the COR reading in which “hij” (he) equaled
“Paul.”
(39) Iedere arbeider die zag dat Paul bijna geen energiemeer had,
vond het heel erg fijn dat hij wat eerder naar huis mocht
vanmiddag.
“Every worker who noticed that Paul was running out of
energy, thought it was very nice that he could go home early
this afternoon.”
In a more recent eye-tracking study, however, Cunnings et al.
(2014) addressed some weaknesses in the stimuli of Koornneef
et al. (2006) and failed to replicate the preference for quantified
c-commanding antecedents over non-c-commanding proper
names. More specifically, in themost relevant experiment of their
study (i.e., Experiment 1) Cunnings et al. embedded sentences
like (40) in a short discourse and manipulated the gender of the
critical pronoun and the preceding proper name19.
(40) Every soldier who knew that James/Helen was watching was
convinced that he/she should wave as the parade passed.
At the critical pronoun and the region immediately following
the pronoun they observed longer re-reading and total reading
times when the proper name antecedent mismatched in gender
with the pronoun. These results, according to Cunnings et al.,
indicated that readers preferred to connect the pronoun to the
linearly closer, yet non-c-commanding antecedent. This would be
inconsistent with the PoB framework, since “it fails to support the
hypothesis that variable binding relations are computed before
coreference assignment.”
Although we agree with Cunnings et al. that these results do
not provide strong evidence in favor of the PoB approach we
19The interpretation of their Experiment 2 is not entirely straightforward due to
the presence of two c-commanding potential antecedents, but the findings of this
experiment seem to be consistent with the predictions of the PoB model.
disagree with the claim that the results are inconsistent with
the approach, for the following reasons. First, in the experiment
of Cunnings et al. the individuals [James/Helen in (40)] were
not introduced previously—note that this was controlled for in
the Koornneef et al. study (2006; see for a detailed discussion
Koornneef, 2008). Therefore it is not unlikely that the readers
were trying to get further information after the topic shift in the
story, and thus tempted to consider a subsequent pronominal
as a source of such information. This would be consistent with
the fact that the reported differences show up in so-called “later”
eye-tracking measures only. Which brings us to a second and
arguably more important issue. That is, since the reading time
differences become visible in later eye-tracking measures only,
the non-c-commanding proper name does not seem to impact
the interpretive costs of the pronoun immediately. Hence, instead
of ruling out an early preference for BV dependencies over COR
dependencies, the findings of Cunnings et al. indicate that COR
distractors can influence the interpretive system during later
stages of processing—i.e., not unlike the defeasible filter model
concerning Principle A (e.g., Sturt, 2003). Crucially, this would be
compatible with the PoB approach in which the choice between
variable binding and coreference for an ambiguous pronoun is
intrinsically free (e.g., Koornneef, 2008).
In all, we do not fully agree with the conclusions as presented
by Cunnings et al. (2014), and hence, we maintain our position
that there is sufficient evidence for a BV preference—and no
convincing evidence against it. Hence, with respect to the good-
enough approach (e.g., Ferreira, 2003; Karimi and Ferreira, 2015),
the focus of our current contribution, we state that the empirical
studies examining bound vs. coreferential dependencies confirm
and extend our previous conclusion, where we reported that
grammatical operations (such as binding of a SELF-anaphor) are
less burdensome for the processor than shallower operations.
Again in contrast to what the good-enough approach predicts,
the experiments discussed above show that the same holds for
binding of a pronominal; the deep variable binding algorithm
is less costly than—and preferred over—the shallow top-down
driven operation of coreference20.
Before we present our final assessment of the good-enough
approach in the domain of anaphoric dependencies, however,
we should address some interesting suggestions of Cunnings
et al. (2014) as to how their results can be related to
more general architectural issues. First, they observe that a
recurrent issue, highly relevant for the bound variable vs.
coreferential (or grammatical vs. extra-grammatical) distinction,
is the role of structure-based vs. unconstrained cue-based
memory retrieval mechanisms (see e.g., Dillon, 2014; Jäger
et al., 2015a, for recent overviews of this issue). Second (and
somewhat related), they suggest that their results are more easily
explained with a uni-modular approach as in Heim (2007),
than with the multi-modular architecture assumed in the PoB
model. These two architectural issues will be addressed in
more detail below.
20Quite interestingly, many of the facts discussed in Karimi and Ferreira (2015)
are consistent with the idea that there is a cost associated with accessing discourse.
The essence of shallow-R processing of anaphoric dependencies appears to consist
of foregoing or postponing the access to discourse, leaving pronominals unvalued.
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Structure-Based vs. Unconstrained
Cue-Based Retrieval
The PoB economy ranking in relation to shallow vs. deep
processing is by no means the only issue that arises in the
field of anaphor processing. For example, by now an important
recurrent issue—although to some extent orthogonal to the
economy issue—is what kind of retrieval mechanism promotes
anaphor resolution. More specifically, based on a growing body
of literature, Cunnings et al. (2014) distinguish two theoretically
plausible ways in which the antecedent of a linguistic element can
be retrieved from (working)memory. As a first possibility, a serial
search mechanism is proposed in which the text representation is
searched in a step-by-step manner until the proper antecedent
for an anaphor has been located. A qualitatively different search
(or retrieval) mechanism is based on the idea of a content-
addressable memory (CAM) architecture (Lewis et al., 2006). In
the latter type of memory systems, previously stored information
can be accessed directly by the use of certain features as retrieval
cues.
Cunnings et al. (2014; see also Jäger et al., 2015a,b) make
the interesting conjecture that a specific instantiation of a
serial search mechanism could be a structure-based retrieval
mechanism in which syntactic tree-configurational information
(e.g., c-command) guides the retrieval process. That is, in these
type of systems “the priority in which antecedents are retrieved
is dependent upon their relative position in the search path” (pp.
42) which would be compatible with an architecture assuming a
BV preference. In contrast, CAM-like, unconstrained cue-based
retrieval assumes that all available cues (e.g., gender, number,
person, animacy, etc.) are used immediately (and in parallel)
to retrieve an anaphor’s antecedent. This system allows for
more flexibility as structural constrains do not have a privileged
status and, hence, COR interpretations of (reflexive) pronominals
are also considered immediately—i.e., not subsequent to BV
interpretations.
Cunnings et al. (2014) claim that the results of their eye-
tracking experiments favor the latter cue-based approach, as
recency (or linear proximity) of the antecedent seemed to guide
the resolution process of a pronoun, rather than the structural
notion of c-command. Indirectly, then, one could state that
there is no solid experimental evidence to maintain a distinction
between variable binding and coreference (cf. our discussion on
uni-modular vs. multi-modular architectures below). Moreover,
it would imply that the same cue-based memory mechanisms
underlying the construction of a range of other (syntactic)
dependencies—such as filler-gap dependencies (McElree et al.,
2003), subject-verb dependencies (Van Dyke and Lewis, 2003;
Van Dyke and McElree, 2006; Van Dyke, 2011, 2007; Wagers
et al., 2009; Dillon et al., 2013), the licensing of negative-polarity
items (Vasishth et al., 2008) and verb-phrase ellipsis (Martin
and McElree, 2008)—are responsible for determining the proper
antecedent for (reflexive) pronominals.
Whether cue-based memory retrieval, however, is indeed the
most valid way to describe anaphoric processing is hotly debated
still. For example, Dillon (2014) shows in a very systematic
overview that reflexives are relatively immune to so-called
retrieval interference, a property that would set them apart from
superficially similar syntactic dependencies like subject–verb
agreement. This conclusion in turn, is disputed by Jäger et al.
(2015a) who conducted reading time experiments on German
and Swedish reflexives, and did observe occurrences of retrieval
interference as predicted by the cue-based approach—and as they
claim, not by the structure-based approach.
Hence, at this point in time we are simply not in the position
to single out a unique framework as the correct approach. In
fact, in the case of anaphora it might well be true that both
types of memory retrieval systems are somehow involved. For
one thing, although binding dependencies are often discussed
in terms of c-command, this certainly does not entail that the
formation of logical form representations should be considered
to be blind to cues such gender and number. Hence a possible,
and in fact very plausible, outcome is that the antecedents for
(bound) pronouns are determined by means of a system that
combines structure- and cue-based search algorithms, with their
respective roles depending on timing. For instance, one might
expect intrusion effects at a stage before the final structure is
established. In all, the precise nature of the interplay between c-
command vs. morpho-syntactic cues is an important issue that
must be left for future research (but note that coding a tree-
configurational relation as a cue for a CAM-like system is not
as straightforward as coding gender and number; see Jäger et al.,
2015a, footnote 4).
Albeit in a different way, this latter question also surfaces in
the second architectural issue raised by Cunnings et al. (2014).
That is, incorporating c-command as a “normal” cue in a CAM
retrieval system, or alternatively, setting it apart as a qualitatively
different cue, can ultimately be interpreted as a debate on uni-
modular vs. multi-modular approaches to anaphor resolution.
Uni-Modular vs. Multi-Modular
Architectures
A very fundamental issue raised by Cunnings et al. (2014),
concerns the (uni)-modular architecture of the anaphoric system.
That is, in contrast to the PoB framework (in which at least three
different modules/algorithms are assumed to underlie anaphora
interpretation) they follow Heim (2007) who, they claim, puts
forward a uni-modular approach. However, we feel that their
interpretation of Heim’s proposal on uni-modularity is less
straightforward than they assume.
First, Heim’s discussion is limited to condition B, and the
status of Reinhart’s Rule I. It does not address condition A, which
uncontroversially is syntactic. So, even if Heim’s endeavor works
for condition B, binding theory as a whole would still minimally
be “bi-modular.”
Second, Heim does not include the interpretation of proper
names and other referential expressions in her discussion. But,
even in her system, one must assume that these are directly
interpreted as some individual in the discourse—but of course,
relative to context. This interpretation strategy, however, must
also be available for certain uses of pronouns. Just like we can
start a story with Helen was watching the parade with a feeling
of disgust. Suddenly . . . .where we are introducing a discourse
individual and slowly building a character while reading on,
we can start a story with She was watching the parade with
disgust. Suddenly. . . and again we will be introducing a discourse
individual and slowly building a character. It seems to us that
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there is no independent ground to treat the reference assignment
differently in these cases. If so, not all cases of pronominal
interpretation will fall under the binding strategy Heim proposes.
Hence, whatever the division of labor in other cases, no truly
uni-modular model for this domain will result in the end.
Heim doesn’t discuss this issue. But if one looks carefully, one
sees that what she achieves is tantamount to building Reinhart’s
Rule I into the binding conditions. Given that she set out to retain
the core of Reinhart’s insight, it is not surprising, then, that it
surfaces in the details of the formulation of condition B. In fact
what her system does is generalize over the “worst case scenario.”
The difference between binding and co-valuation shows up in
the explicit role of context in the latter, but not in the former.
This is interesting by itself, since from a processing perspective,
this would make it quite unexpected for co-valuation to require
fewer resources than binding. But it also shows that the core of
the contrast between binding and co-valuation is in fact retained
in her system.
Note furthermore that Heim’s unification program is based
on the idea that condition B is essentially semantic. However,
as shown in Volkova and Reuland (2014), this idea cannot be
maintained in view of languages with locally bound pronominals.
Such cross-linguistic variation shows that there must be a
syntactic component in condition B (see Reuland, 2011a, and
Volkova and Reuland, 2014, for further evidence that condition B
is in fact not a unified phenomenon). Pronoun resolution in such
languages [as for instance Frisian, or (Tegi) Khanty] has not yet
been studied experimentally to our knowledge. Such experiments
could shed further light on the way interpretive dependencies
are processed, and more specifically, on the contrasting economy
rankings and its relation to shallow and deep processing as
proposed in the good-enough and PoB frameworks.
This brings us back to the issue we started out with, and in fact
to a conclusion21
CONCLUSION
As part of our more general goal of reassessing the interpretation
of experimental results in view of the ongoing advances made in
theoretical linguistics and psycholinguistics, the main focus of
the current contribution was to evaluate the core assumptions
of the good-enough framework as proposed by Ferreira and
colleagues (e.g., Ferreira, 2003; Ferreira and Patson, 2007; Karimi
and Ferreira, 2015). We structured our discussion around a
recent elaboration of the good-enough approach (Karimi and
Ferreira, 2015) in which an explicit distinction is being made
21Many further interesting issues about the processing of interpretive
dependencies arise. One factor that sets the processing of pronominals
apart from the processing of SELF-anaphors, is that pronominals don’t have to be
bound, whereas SELF-anaphors in non-exempt positions and simplex anaphors
must be bound. In argument positions SELF-anaphors and bound pronominals
are in complementary distribution, but not in locative and directional PPs. It
would be interesting to investigate the effect of such non-complementarity.
Also non-local binding of simplex anaphors in Dutch, German, and Mainland
Scandinavian languages raises interesting issues. They must be bound within the
sentence – although their domain varies. Especially in Scandinavian they allow a
choice of antecedents, and in the non-local domain they are not in complementary
distribution with bound pronominals. The question is, then, how precisely these
factors show up in the processing of these elements.
.
between “deep” bottom-up syntactic algorithms and “shallow”
top-down semantic/discourse operations. Crucially, given the
presumed complexity of syntactic algorithms, the latter type
of (extra-grammatical) heuristics should be preferred, thereby
inducing good-enough representations of an utterance or text.
As it turned out, one of the key-notions in the discussion
had to be reassessed. That is, we proposed that one must make
a distinction between shallow-TD processing as a top-down
process, and shallow-R processing as involving a reduced input
(see e.g., Stewart et al., 2007). Taking this into account, the
conclusion in terms of the shallow equivalence and the shallow
advantage assumptions (cf. Principle 1 and 2 in Karimi and
Ferreira, 2015) as formulated at the outset of this contribution
are straightforward and simple. First, in the domain of anaphoric
dependencies the equivalence assumption does not hold. There
are binding dependencies whose interpretation cannot even be
approximated by shallow-TD procedures. Second, and perhaps
for current purposes more importantly, we reviewed a variety
of experiments bearing on a purported shallow-TD advantage.
None of the experiments provided support for such an advantage.
Rather the opposite is the case: in the domain of anaphoric
dependencies deep algorithmic computations are preferred over
shallow-TD interpretational processes. Such a preference not
only shows up in the comparison between syntax and what
one may broadly call the interpretive system, but also within
the latter system, i.e., between deep, structure-based (variable
binding), and shallower context-based (coreference) interpretive
procedures.
There is one important proviso: as becomes clear from
the discussion (e.g., regarding Heim, 2007) context-based
interpretive procedures may in fact require more computation
than meets the eye. Hence, properly considered, they may not
be as shallow as they prima facie appear to be. Perhaps, then,
they are more costly because they, at least in some cases, require
more sophisticated computations. But if this is so, this casts doubt
on the very idea that there are truly shallow procedures. Such
shallow procedures may well be no more than illusory effects that
arise if some material is not admitted into the buffer. Therefore,
we submit the bold claim that, until proponents of the existence
of shallow procedures offer precise and falsifiable descriptions,
Occam’s razor requires us to treat them as just that: illusions.
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